2017

  • Oracle Efficient Learning and Auction Design, MIT EECS, Theory Colloquium, February 2017
  • Econometric Theory for Games, Cornell CS, three lecture mini-course, January 2017

2016

  • Computationally Efficient Learning in Auctions, Stanford CS, Theory Seminar, October 2016
  • Econometrics for Learning Agents, Stanford GSB, Economics Seminar, October 2016
  • Bayesian Exploration, Workshop on Information and Social Economics, Caltech, August 2016
  • Econometric Theory for Games, Tutorial on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, UIUC, CS Colloquium, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Duke University, CS Colloquium, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Northwestern University, CS Colloquium, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Imperial College, Department of Computing, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Caltech, CMS Frontiers workshop, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, UMass Amherst, CS Colloquium, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Google Research, March 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Columbia University, CS Colloquium, February 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, MIT, EECS/IDSS Seminar, February 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, EPFL, IC Colloquium, February 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Microsoft Research, New England, February 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, February 2016
  • Learning in Strategic Environments: Theory and Data, Institute of Science and Technology (IST), Austria, January 2016

2015

  • Econometrics for Learning Agents, Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, Seminar on "Simplicity and Complexity in Economics", October 2015
  • Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games, Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, EconCS Whiteboard Talks series, September 2015
  • Econometrics for Learning Agents, INFORMS, November 2015
  • Econometrics for Learning Agents, Google Theory Seminar, September 2015
  • Econometrics for Learning Agents, MSR Economics Seminar, August 2015
  • Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population, University of Pennsylvania, CS Theory Seminar, May 2015
  • Price of Anarchy in Auctions, University of Washington, CS Theory Seminar, March 2015
  • Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration, MSR Redmond, Theory lunch, March 2015

2014

  • Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets, Northwestern University, CS Colloquium, April 2014
  • Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets, MSR Redmond, Theory group, March 2014
  • Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets, MSR NYC Colloquium, February 2014
  • Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, Kellog School of Business, January 2014
  • Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets, MSR Sillicon Valley Colloquium, January 2014

2013

  • Price of Anarchy in Auctions, Tutorial at the Conference on Web and Internet Economics, December 2013
  • Social Status and the Design of Optimal Badges, NBER Market Design Working Group, October 2013
  • Composable and Efficient Mechanisms, INFORMS, October 2013
  • Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, INFORMS, October 2013
  • Composable and Efficient Mechanisms, Harvard University, EconCS Seminar, September 2013
  • Composable and Efficient Mechanisms, MSR New England, Game Theory and Computation Seminar, August 2013
  • Composable and Efficient Mechanisms, Dagstuhl Seminar on the Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics, April 2013
  • Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, Second Cambridge Area Economics and Computation Day, April 2013

2012

  • Composable and Efficient Mechanisms, Northwestern University, Theory Seminar, December 2012
  • Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions: How (not) to sell your Cookies, Fifth New York Computer Science and Economics Day, December 2012
  • Selling Third-Party Information in Common Value Auctions, Barbados, Bellairs Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory, April 2012
  • Efficiency in Sequential Auctions, International Symposium on Mathematical Programming (ISMP) 2012, August 2012

2011

  • Sequential Auctions and Externalities, Fourth New York Computer Science and Economics Day, September 2011